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Abstract
This paper studies the interaction of financing constraints and labor market imperfec-
tions on the labor market and economic activity. My analysis builds on the agency cost
framework of Carlstrom and Fuerst [1998. Agency costs and business cycles. Economic
Theory, 12(3):583-597]. The aim of this article is to show that financing constraints can
substantially amplify and propagate total factor productivity shocks in cyclical labor
market dynamics. I find that under the Nash bargaining solution financing constraints
increase substantially the volatility of wages, and in turn, amplification for the labor
variables falls short of the observed volatilities in the data. Atop of this, the comove-
ment between output and labor share is counterfactual. However, there is substantial
scope for any type of wage rigidity and financing constraints to reinforce each other,
and to generate the observed volatilities in the labor market, moreover, to produce a
wide range of comovements between output and labor share.
JEL: E24, E32, J64, G24
Keywords: Credit and search frictions; Labor market; Unemployment;
1 Introduction
What role do financing constraints play for the cyclical behaviour of employment? This
question has been always high in the agenda of both politicians and academicians as soon
∗I am grateful to Michael Burda and Sanjay Chugh for helpful discussions and comments. This research
was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the CRC 649 "Economic Risk".
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as the Great Depression. The idea that financing constraints, which may stem from moral
hazard and/or adverse selection, could be relevant not only for corporate finance but also
for macroeconomics has distilled in recent macroeconomic research.1 Both the theoretical
and empirical literature on financing constraints has focused on fixed capital investment
decisions.2 However, there are very few studies on the effects of financing constraints on
the employment decisions of firms. Moreover these studies have dealt mainly with the
influence of financing constraints on the level of employment.3 The payment of wages makes
hiring sensitive to the financial market imperfections that firms face. Missing to account
for the effect of financial constraints on wages means missing to account for a powerful
effect on hiring and on economic activity in general. Moreover the forward-looking nature
of employment also makes firms sensitive to future expected financing constraints.
This paper studies the interaction between financing constraints and labor market im-
perfections in the business cycle context on the behaviour of labor markets and economic
activity. The aim of this article is to show that financing constraints can substantially amplify
and propagate total factor productivity shocks in cyclical labor market dynamics (hereafter
referred to as TFP). I focus on TFP shocks as the driving force of business cycles mainly for
comparability with much of the existing business cycle literature.4 I find that (a) financing
constraints are able to simultaneously generate both an effect of persistence and an effect of
amplification on real economic activity. (b) However, under the assumption that the worker
and firm bargain over the gains from trade, splitting the surplus according to the Nash bar-
gaining solution (Nash, 1953), financing constraints increase substantially the volatility of
wages. In turn, amplification for the labor variables falls short of the observed volatilities
in the data. Moreover, the comovement between output and labor share is counterfactual.
And (c) there is substantial scope for any type of wage rigidity and financing constraints to
reinforce each other, and to generate the observed volatilities in the labor market, moreover,
to produce a wide range of comovements between output and labor share.
I model financing constraints following the agency cost framework of Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1998) (CF). Similar to them, I assume that informational problems may arise in
1Examples of papers making this type of early, significant contributions to the literature include Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
and Bernanke et al. (1999). Currently, the literature has burgeoned with a non-exhaustive list of examples
such as Cúrdia and Woodford (2009), Gertler and Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (forthcoming) and
Gilchrist et al. (2009).
2Hubbard (1998) provides a review of the literature.
3See, e.g., Acemoglu (2001) and Wasmer and Weil (2004).
4My treatment here follows broadly Pissarides (1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the early
analysis that integrates the labor search model into the real business cycle framework (Andolfatto, 1996;
Merz, 1995), and recent analysis by Shimer (2010).
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the production of aggregate output (hereafter, the ’output’ model). The main insight in
the CF model is that the asymmetric information between an entrepreneur (the borrower)
and a financial intermediary (the lender) together with a costly state verification leads to a
premium on the external finance. The premium arises because the lender monitors defaulting
entrepreneurs and transfers this implicit cost onto the average cost of credit. In turn, the
finance premium a firm pays to run a risky production manifests itself as an endogenous
mark-up over the firm’s total input costs: the firm demands a premium over operating
cost. The appeal of the framework is that the financing constraints are endogenous over the
business cycle.
I depart from CF in two main respects. First, to study employment (unemployment),
contrary to total hours, I introduce labor search imperfections. There are two main reasons
why departing from a Walrasian market are beneficial for the current analysis: (a) Labor
search models provide an ideal laboratory for understanding employment and have been used
extensively for this purpose. And (b) recent research suggests that search models have the
potential to improve our understanding of business cycle fluctuations by delivering a frame-
work for the analysis of alternative wage determination processes (Rogerson and Shimer,
forthcoming). Second, following Faia and Monacelli (2007), I assume that the mean distri-
bution of risky project outcomes across entrepreneurs is linked to the aggregate TFP in order
for the ’output’ model to better match the empirical evidence on the cyclical behavior of
the external finance premium. The empirically observed finance premium is countercyclical,
while the CF model predicts a counterfactual (procyclical) finance premium.5 As a con-
sequence, in the discussed model economy, financing constraints generate both an effect of
amplification and persistence (i.e., more pronounced hump-shaped dynamics of output and
employment, as in CF) in response to the TFP shocks.6
Financing constraints seem a promising avenue for answering the question of why em-
ployment is so volatile. First, as mentioned above, they amplify shocks. Second, in the
current framework, they have a direct impact on employment. Namely, relaxing the financ-
ing constraints allows the firm to run bigger risky projects, thus loosely speaking spend
more resources on the project and less on external financing costs. In turn, a bigger project
translates into higher employment. However, following the conventional way wages are de-
termined in the model and the way Nash bargaining is calibrated, wages respond strongly to
changes in TFP shocks, stronger than in an environment lacking financing constraints, and
5The limitation of the CF framework to account for cyclical behavior of the external finance premium
was first noted by Gomes et al. (2003).
6In contrast to CF, where trade-off exists between amplification and propagation.
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the incentives for the firms to hire do not change very much over the business cycle. Despite
the fact that financing constraints affect hiring directly, the Nash bargaining wage overshad-
ows the model’s ability to reproduce key labor market variables. This result is manifestation
of the findings in Shimer (2005).
Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) have argued that real wage rigidity is central to explaining
the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies. Essentially, wage rigidity is central for
giving the financing constraints a role in labor dynamics in the ’output’ model in their own
right. The reason behind is that under any type of rigid wage the loosening of the financing
constraints is channelled into hiring (and not into an increase of the wage). The amplification
of labor market variables in the ’output’ model is increased significantly. Moreover, the
’output’ model can generate a wide range of comovements between output and labor share
dependent on the wage rigidity. On the contrary, the model without agency costs has
implications for the labor share that seem too extreme: the labor share under rigid wages
becomes almost perfectly negatively correlated with output. It seems that the substantive
contribution of search models with financing constraints relies on the presence of match-
specific rents and the opportunity for a richer set of wage setting processes. This is where
the contribution of the financing constraints lies: financial conditions lead to a much larger
set of match-specific rents.
There are two studies most closely related to mine, both in terms of the question addressed
- financing frictions may induce an amplified response of the labor market to aggregate TFP
shocks - as well as methodology - build a business cycle framework in which the costly-state-
verification problem is blended with search frictions a la Mortensen and Pissarides, Chugh
(2009) and Petrosky-Nadeau (2009). I view my analysis as highly complementary to the two
studies, despite the contrary conclusions we reach. The two papers state that conditional
on a countercyclical external financing premium a financial accelerator mechanism amplifies
labor market fluctuations. I agree with this conclusion, however conditional on a dose of
wage rigidity. The first author presents some sophisticated arguments that induce some
rigidity in the wage, similar to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).7 The second author builds
wage rigidity directly by assuming that only hiring costs are subject to working capital
requirements. This modelling assumption changes the relative volatilities of the firms’ total
input production costs. It makes hiring costs more volatile relative to the wage bill costs.
7It is worth noting that the authors Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) as well as Chugh (2009) do not view
their paper as one with wage rigidities. They introduce an unemployment benefit term in the wage rule,
worker’s outside option, that is basically a constant. Also they calibrate the Nash bargaining parameter
using information that wages move less than one-for-one with productivity, which gives them a small value
for the workers’ bargaining power.
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The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section I present the theoretical
framework. Section 3 discusses calibration issues and long-run equilibrium properties of the
model economies. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. Various technical
details are relegated to appendices.
2 The model economy
The core framework is a closed economy CF model. The model has a representative house-
hold, firms and financial intermediaries. Each household consists of a continuum of infinitely-
lived workers of measure one. Each firm is owned by an infinitely-lived entrepreneur (below
I use ’entrepreneur’ and ’firm’ interchangeably). Firms undertake risky production activities
and seek external resources in excess of their different and time-varying levels of internal
funds. The household provides the resources that are channeled from financial intermedi-
aries to firms using financial contracts. Financial frictions are a consequence of information
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. Because of the financial frictions and a limited
supply of internal funds, firms are limited in borrowing by the premium associated with
external finance.
The key modification of the model is the inclusion of labor search frictions. Each firm
employs nt workers in the current period. To hire workers firms must expend resources which
are assumed to be linear in the number of vacancies. Workers do not face job-finding costs.
The total number of unemployed workers searching for a job is ut ≡ 1 − nt−1.8 Following
convention, I assume that the aggregate number of new hires, mt, is a Cobb-Douglas (CD)
function of unemployed workers and vacancies, mt = luψt v
1−ψ
t , where the parameter l reflects
the efficiency of the matching process. The current probability that a firm fills a vacancy,
µ(θt), is given by µ(θt) ≡ mt/vt = l̄θ−ψ where θt ≡ vt/ut is labor market tightness, the
ratio of vacancies, vt, to searching unemployed workers, ut. Similarly, the probability an
unemployed worker finds a job, l(θt), is given by l(θt) ≡ mt/ut = l̄θ1−ψ. Both firms and
workers take µ(θt) and l(θt) as given. In a stationary environment, the above probabilities
define the mean duration of unfilled vacancies and unemployment respectively. Finally, each
firm exogenously separates from a fraction 0 < x < 1 of existing workers each period, where
1− x is the probability a worker survives with the firm until the next period.
I now proceed to describe the behavior of the different sectors of the economy, along with
the key resource constraints.




This section provides an overview of the firm sector. Firms possess a production technology
and hire workers and capital to produce goods. Firms are subject to an aggregate shock as
well as idiosyncratic shocks. Timing of events in a given time period can be summarized as
follows:
• Aggregate shock to productivity realizes.
• Firms borrow resources from the loan market signing a contract (which is described
below).
• Firms rent capital from households and entrepreneurs and post vacancies to attract
new workers.
• Matching outcomes from current period’s recruiting are realized and firms bargain
wages individually with the workers.
• Stock of workers, employed from the previous period, break up exogenously with the
firms and become unemployed, at least till next period.
• After observing the idiosyncratic shocks, firms produce goods and sell them in the
goods market.
• Firms either repay their loans or declare bankruptcy and are monitored.






where τt is an aggregate TFP shock that follows the following process: log τt = ρ log τt−1 +εt,
εt
iid∼ N (0, σ2τ ). The idiosyncratic productivity shock ωt, with mean ωmt, is unknown at the
time when the debt contract is signed and is independent and identically distributed across
time. The shock variable has a continuous differentiable cumulative distribution function
F (ωt, τt) and a density function φ (ωt, τt). The riskiness of firm’s i project is determined
by the variance of the idiosyncratic shock, σ2ω. Notice that the average productivity of
each entrepreneur is time-varying (e.g., Faia and Monacelli, 2007). I assume that each
entrepreneur is on average more productive when total factor productivity τt increases. This
feature is key in driving the cyclical properties of the cost of external finance.
In the CF model the firm commits to and pays for its capital rentals, wage bills and hiring
after observing the aggregate shock, τt, but before observing the idiosyncratic shock, ωit and
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thus before any output and revenue is realized.9 Let wt be the real wage rate, rt the rental
rate on capital and κ the per period cost of keeping a vacancy open. Respectively, hiring
costs for an individual firm are given by ωmtτtκvit, expressed in terms of the consumption
goods.10 Total input costs are given by sit = wtnit + rtkit + ωmtτtκvit. The firm uses the
funds it receives from financial intermediaries as well as its net worth, ait, to finance the
firm’s input bill. I suppose that ait < sit. The entrepreneur’s internal funds consists of the
beginning-of-period market value of its accumulated capital stock, zit:
ait = zit [(1− δ) + rt] , 11 (2)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital.
The entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic shock is privately observed, and thus creates a moral
hazard problem with external financing (as the entrepreneur may wish to underreport the
true value of the shock). The financial intermediaries can not observe the outcome of a
leveraged project. In case of bankruptcy financial intermediaries incur a cost to verify
the outcome that is proportional to the size of the firm’s input cost, χsit. This costly
state verification (CSV) ties the ability to obtain external finance to the net worth of an
entrepreneur. Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson (1987) show that
in a world with CSV the optimal, incentive-compatible debt contract is a standard one period
debt contract.12 The contract is characterized by two values: project size sit and a critical
ω, denoted by ω̄it. This critical or cut-off ω̄it is the realization that triggers bankruptcy:
if ωit < ω̄it then bankruptcy occurs and the financial intermediaries seize all of the firm’s
output, while if ωit ≥ ω̄it, then the loan is re-paid and the firm keeps the excess output.
At this stage, I can define the functions g (ω̄t, τt) and f (ω̄t, τt) that represent the sharing
9A relatively small proportion of goods in the real economy are ’made to order,’ and even when they are,
only a relatively small fraction of the payment is made by the purchaser up front.
10The motivation for indexing hiring costs to aggregate TFP, τt, (and to the idiosyncratic productivity,
ωmt, in the ’output’ model, but not in the ’investment’ model) similar to Blanchard and Galí (2008), is
to avoid effects of productivity shocks on the cost of hiring relative to the cost of producing, an effect I
believe is better left out of the model for the current analysis. Alternatively, Shimer (2010) assumes that
employees are used either in the production of consumption goods or in hiring. Both specifications lead
to the unemployment rate being invariant to TFP shocks in a model with search frictions without capital
and financing constraints, and under particular assumptions on preferences (balanced growth and additive
separability between consumption and non-work activity). The reason for this result is that income and
substitution effects cancel, leading to no change in employment, and in unemployment.
11For completeness, notice that net worth have to consist of capital income share and an arbitrarily small
noncapital income share. The latter one is intended to provide an opportunity to bankrupt entrepreneurs
to initialize projects in the current period. Since this has no effect on dynamics, I ignore it for simplicity.
12A crucial assumption of the CSV models is that both the lender and borrower are risk-neutral. In the
current framework, entrepreneurs discounts the future stronger than household. As for the financial inter-
mediary, there is no aggregate risk as the contract is: first, intra-period and second, financial intermediaries
pool contracts, and thus, diversify away idiosyncratic risk.
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rule between financial intermediaries and firms-borrowers (where firms’ subscripts have been








(ωt − ω̄t) dF (ωt, τt) ≡
∫ ∞
ω̄t
ωtdF (ωt, τt)− ω̄t (1− F (ω̄t, τt)) . (4)
Notice that the sharing rule accounts for the dependence of the idiosyncratic mean on the
realization of the aggregate shock, τt. The function f (ω̄t, τt) integrates only over values
of ωt in excess of ω̄t, while g (ω̄t, τt) integrates over the lower part of the support. The two
functions do not add to one: f (ω̄t, τt)+g (ω̄t, τt) = 1−χF (ω̄t, τt). This is due to the fact that
there are costs of monitoring to be accounted for, χF (ω̄t, τt). Since the firm’s production
function is constant returns to scale (CRS) these bankruptcy costs imply that the firm’s
output must sell at a mark-up, pt. Because of this mark-up, the monitoring cost measured
in terms of final output is ptχst. In terms of final output, the firm’s expected return on the
financial contract is thus ptf (ω̄t, τt) st, while that of financial intermediaries is ptg (ω̄t, τt) st.
Debt contract
Due to financial intermediaries being perfectly competitive, pt is taken as given in the
maximization problem. The financial contract maximizes the expected firm’s payoff
max
st,ω̄t
ptf (ω̄t, τt) st (5)
subject to the zero profit condition on the financial intermediary:
ptg (ω̄t, τt) st ≥ st − at. (6)
In equilibrium, any financial intermediary holds a pooled and perfectly safe portfolio. There-
fore, the financial firm can obtain its funds at a riskless, intra-period opportunity cost to
funds which equals unity. Perfect competition and free entry in the financial market imply
that lenders’ net cash flow must be zero in each period, i.e., the expected return from the
lending activity would equal the opportunity cost of finance. It is easy to show that the
solution to the problem above implies the following two first-order conditions:
ptf (ω̄it, τt) =
f ′ (ω̄it, τt)
g′ (ω̄it, τt)
[ptg (ω̄it, τt)− 1] , (7)
sit = ait [1/ (1− ptf (ω̄it, τt))] . (8)
8
A few observations are in order. First, if there are no monitoring costs χ = 0 then the mark-
up disappears, pt = 1. Hence, the agency costs are manifested by an endogenous mark-up
over production costs. Notice also from Eq. (7) that ω̄it is a function only of pt, and not of
the level of net worth of the firm. That is, all firms receive the same basic terms on their
debt contract. Eq. (8) shows that st/at is independent of the level of the entrepreneur’s
net worth. That is, the contracts differ only in size - a firm with larger net worth simply
implements a larger project size st. Therefore, Eq. (8) allows immediate aggregation.13
Given CRS, the cut-off ω̄t determines the division of net revenues between borrower
and lender, and satisfies: ω̄t ≡ rLt (st − at) /ptst, where rLt is the gross lending rate. From
this definition, it is obvious that the gross lending rate and the external finance premium
are independent of the firm’s net worth. Thus, firms with any level of net worth, at, pay
the the same external finance premium, ςt ≡ rLt − 1 = ω̄t/g (ω̄t, τt) − 1. One can derive
the expression for the external finance premium by combining the definition for the cut-
off threshold, ω̄t, together with Eq. (8). Notice that, in the case in which the mean ωmt
varies with aggregate TFP, the lender’s income share g (ω̄t, τt) also depends on aggregate
productivity. The behavior of the income share g (ω̄t, τt) relative to the threshold value ω̄t
becomes critical in driving the cyclical properties of the finance premium.
Firm’s maximization problem
Firm i controls its current workforce nit by posting vacancies vit. I assume that new
matches at firm i at the beginning of period t are proportional to the ratio of its vacancies
to total vacancies posted, vit/vt, so that vitmt/vt = vitµ (θt) is hiring by firm i. Evolution of
employment at firm i can then be written as
nit = (1− x)nit−1 + vitµ (θt) . (9)
Period-t workforce is the sum of the number of last period’s surviving workers, (1− x)nit−1,
and new hires, vitµ (θt).
Let βΛt,t+1 be the firm’s stochastic discount factor between period t and t+1, where β is
the household’s subjective discount factor and Λt,t+1 is defined later below. The stochastic
discount factor, capital rental prices and wages are taken as exogenous by the firm when
choosing employment and capital.14 Taking the debt contract outcome as given, the firm’s
13This aggregation result is a natural implication of the CRS assumptions in the monitoring technology
and the firm’s production function. Since the description of firm’s maximization problem and the Nash-wage
bargaining follow below, I keep the firm-specific subscripts for now.
14Assuming that firms take wages as exogenous when choosing employment allows me to ignore an addi-
tional complexity. If Nash-bargained wages depend on the marginal product of labor, large firms, as in the
current framework, would have an incentive to overhire. The reason behind is the motive to weaken incum-
9








it − pt (wtnit + rtkit + ωmtτtκvit) + Etβ {Λt,t+1Jit+1}
}
(10)
subject to the employment constraint Eq. (9). The Et symbol denotes the expectation
operator conditional on information available at date t.









Jn,it = (1− α)
yit
nit
− ptwt + Etβ (1− x) {Λt,t+1Jn,it+1} . (13)
After the period t shock, τt, is realized, both households and entrepreneurs supply their
stock of capital. Thus, total beginning-of-period t capital, kt, is the sum of the two stocks
of capital. Condition (11) for the firm’s capital demand is equating the marginal product of
capital to the rental rate. Notice that capital rental price will be below its marginal product,
because of the agency cost mark-up.
The first-order condition with respect to vacancies is given by Eq. (12), while the dis-
counted stream of expected future profits per worker, Jn,it, is given by Eq. (13). Combining
(12) and (13) yields the job creation condition
ptωmtτtκ
µ (θt)
= (1− α) yit
nit







Condition (14) equates the marginal cost of hiring a worker with the marginal benefit.
The latter is given on the right hand side, which consists of the net flow profit per worker








At the end of the period, after all other economic decisions have been made, all production
input plus rental costs paid, the entrepreneur has ptsitf (ω̄it, τt) units of output that he can
either transfer back to the household, ζit, or accumulate as capital, zit+1, for use as collateral
bent workers’ bargaining power (where the term ’bargaining power’ is used loosely in the sense that the Nash
bargaining parameter is hold fixed). This would imply a wage wt that at the margin is endogenous to the
firms’s level of employment. See Stole and Zwiebel (1996) for a general discussion. Krause and Lubik (2007)
show that this additional effect has only small effects on the dynamic behaviour of labor search models.
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(βι)t {Λ0,tζit} , 0 < ι < 1, (15)
to the sequence of budget constraints:
ζit + zit+1 ≤ ptsitf (ω̄it, τt) , (16)
where Λ0,t is the time-t household’s subjective discount factor. Note that the entrepreneur
discounts utility at a higher rate, βι, than the household. This intertemporal problem renders
the following Euler equation:
1 = Etβι
{
{Λt,t+1 [rt+1 + (1− δ)]}
{
pt+1f (ω̄it+1, τt+1)
1− pt+1g (ω̄it+1, τt+1)
}}
. (17)
The right-hand side of Eq. (17) is the expected discounted rate of return for an en-
trepreneur who is not bankrupt in period t. The term in the second curly brackets is the
safe rate of return on capital (i.e., the one gained by the households). The term in the third
curly brackets is the return on internal funds, which can be shown to strictly exceed unity
for all t. That is, entrepreneurs earn a higher intertemporal rate of return on saving than
do households. As a result, entrepreneurs with the same discount rate as households would
save at a higher rate, eventually accumulating enough capital so that they have no need to
borrow from financial markets. The assumption, ι < 1 insures that the entrepreneurs never
hold enough wealth to overcome the financing constraints.
2.2 Households
In the presence of unemployment risk, one may observe differences in consumption levels
between employed and unemployed consumers. However, under the assumption of perfect
insurance markets, consumption is equalized across consumers. This is equivalent to as-
suming the existence of a large representative household, as in Merz (1995). The household
pools incomes and allocates consumption in period t, in order to maximize the sum of house-
hold utility, and so equalizes the marginal utility of consumption across individuals. With
additive separability between consumption and leisure, this implies the household equalizes
11




βt {log (cjt)− γnjt} , 0 < β < 1, (18)
where cjt is consumption, γ > 0 is the relative disutility of work, and njt the number of
employed workers. Notice that the household supplies inelastically workers to the market,
i.e., the household effectively has an infinite Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Each period, the household allocates its wealth to purchases of consumption goods and to
accumulation of capital. It has the following sources of income: wage bills, capital rentals,
interest income on deposit holdings, dt, and transfers from the firms, ζjt. The household
faces the period-by-period intertemporal budget constraint:




dt + ζjt. (19)
As explained above, the financial intermediaries pay the household a zero rate of return
rDt − 1 = 0 on deposits because the household has no alternative use of its funds over the
short time span when firms requires financing.
Household’s employment evolves according to the following law of motion:
njt = (1− x)njt−1 + l (θt) (1− njt−1) . (20)
The household’s welfare criterion from Eq. (18) can be rewritten as
Hjt = max
cjt,kjt+1,njt
{log (cjt)− γnjt + Etβ {Hjt+1}} . (21)
The household optimizes its life-time utility (21) by choosing consumption and capital to
accumulate subject to the household budget constraint (19). Denote λjt the time-t Lagrange
multiplier on the flow budget constraint. The following optimality conditions must hold:
λjt = (cjt)
−1 , (22)
1 = Etβ {Λjt,t+1 [rt+1 + (1− δ)]} , (23)
with the addition of (19) holding with equality. Denote βΛjt,t+1 = βλjt+1/λjt the house-
hold’s pricing kernel between periods t and t + 1. Eq. (22) defines the marginal utility of
consumption at period t, λjt. Eq. (23) is the Euler condition for household’s capital accumu-
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lation. It states that the household prefers expected marginal utility to be constant across
time periods, unless the expected gross real return on capital, Et [rt+1 + (1− δ)], exceeding
household’s time preference induces it to lower its consumption today relative to the future.
Using the envelope condition for employment, I derive the marginal value to the household
of having one member employed rather than unemployed, Hn,jt, which is a determinant of
the bargaining problem:
Hn,jt = λjtwt − γ + Etβ (1− x− l (θt+1)) {Hn,jt+1} . (24)
The worker’s contribution to the welfare of his household is given by the real wage (in
utils), minus labor disutility, plus the future value of the job conditional on non-separation,
minus the value this worker would contribute if he searched for another job.
2.3 Wage Bargaining
I assume, as in most of the labor search literature, that worker and firm bargain over wage
at the individual level over the joint surplus of their match, Sn,t = Jn,t + Hn,t, according
to the Nash bargaining solution. Given that in equilibrium all firms and workers behave
similarly I can drop the i and j subscripts. The wage wt maximizes the weighted geometric




η, where 0 < η < 1 is the
worker’s bargaining power in the wage negotiation process. If there are no gains from trade,







Substituting the expressions for Jn,t and Hn,t (Eq. (13) and Eq. (24)) in the sharing
rule (25), and using Eq. (12), it is straightforward to show that the wage that solves the







+ (1− η) γ
λt
, (26)









+ 1 is a composite term that depends on the current
and the expected future mark-ups.
A few remarks concerning the wage rule condition are in order. Eq. (26) states that
the bargained wage is a weighted average of two components, with the weight on the first
component equal to worker’s bargaining power. The first component is the marginal con-
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tribution to the match (MCM) (the marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL), i.e., the
marginal product of labor divided by the mark-up, augmented with the discounted savings
in future hiring costs that result from having to hire fewer workers the following period).
The second component is the marginal cost of work activity (in consumption units), i.e.,
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (MRS). The bargaining
weight, dividing the joint surplus of the match, determines how close the wage is to either
the MCM or to the MRS.
A second point concerns the influence of agency costs on the wage level. Similar to the
capital rental rate, the price of labor is below its level in a setup that lacks financial frictions.
Namely, the weighted average of the MCM and the MRS is lower because of the presence
of the agency cost mark-up. Finally, it is obvious that the composite term, ℵt+1, captures
the forward-looking aspect of employment. Namely, it takes into account how the difference
between current and future financial conditions affects the cost of replacing a worker. Notice
that in the absence of agency costs (χ = 0 for all t), Eq. (26) reduces to a Nash-wage
schedule in a model that lacks financing constraints.
2.4 Market Clearing
In a competitive equilibrium, all agents’ optimality conditions are satisfied and all markets
clear. I assume a symmetric equilibrium throughout, which entails identical choices for all
variables. Defining aggregates as the averages of firm specific variables, equilibrium in the
labor market requires that




Aggregate capital, the sum of households’ and entreprenuers’ capital, follows
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it. (28)
Furthermore, loans must be equal to deposits,
st − at = dt. (29)
Using the household budget contraint and definitions for firms’ profits, the resulting aggre-
gate income identity is:
yt(1− χF (ω̄t, τt)) = ct + it + ωmtτtκvt. (30)
14
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that the production of goods be allocated to private
consumption by households and investment. Final amount of consumption and investment is
reduced due to the presence of costs that originate from monitoring and from hiring activities
(i.e., the presence of both financing constraints and labor market imperfections endogenously
distorts aggregate production).
3 Steady state
Before turning to the results in this section I briefly discuss: (a) how the parameter values
are chosen and (b) the steps of determining the long-run equilibrium.
3.1 Calibration
I calibrate the model to the U.S. using data from 1951:q1 to 2010:q1. Data are taken from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Conference Board, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’
database FRED®II and National Income and Product Accounts Tables. Data is described
in Appendix, Section B. I use the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a conventional filter weight of
1,600 to extract the business cycle component from the data in logs.
The time unit of the model is meant to be a month in order to properly capture the
high rate of job finding in U.S. data. The calibrated parameter values and the targets are
summarized in Table 1. Some implied steady state values in the ’output’ economy are given
in Table 2.
I set the subjective discount factor to β = 1.04−
1
12 , yielding an annual real interest rate
of 4 percent. In line with the evidence reported in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), I set χ
equal to 0.25 and the average monthly bankruptcy rate F (ω̄, 1) to 1.3%/3 (close to from the
Dun and Bradstreet data set quarterly value, .974%). I target a long-run equilibrium annual
external finance premium ς = 0.02 (200 basis points), the risk premium spread on corporate
bonds estimate in Longstaff et al. (2005). By imposing Eω = 1, I solve numerically for σω
equal to 0.749. ι is set to 0.996 in order to fix the targeted annual external finance premium.
I assume that the mean of the idiosyncratic productivity is given by ωmt = Γ (τt) = τ 1+υt ,
with spill-over parameter υ equal to 2, following Faia and Monacelli (2007).
Shimer (2005) infers time series for the job finding and separation rate from BLS data
on unemployment and short term unemployment. The average monthly separation rate
is x = 0.034 while the average monthly job finding rate is l (θ) = 0.45. With the above
two values I fix the average unemplyoment rate u to 0.07. I use the average value of the
15




12 time-discount factor; matches annual real rate of 4 percent;
γ 0.824 scaling factor to disutility of work; imposed by model’s steady state;
η 0.5 bargaining power of workers; conventional value;
Firm sector
z 1 technological progress; normalization;
F (ω̄, 1) 1.3%/3 bankruptcy rate in a period; from the Dun and Bradstreet data set;
χ 0.25 percent of realized project’s loss in bankruptcy; Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
ι 0.996 entrepreneur’s time-discount factor; match finance premium of annual 200 b.p.;
σω 0.749 idiosyncratic std. dev. of production; match finance premium of annual 200 b.p.;
ψ 0.5 elasticity of matches w.r.t. unemployment; Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001);
x 0.034 exogenous period rate of separation; Shimer (2005);
κ 0.626 hiring cost; imposed by model’s steady state;
l̄ 0.613 efficiency of matching; match θ = 0.539;
υ 2 spill-over parameter;
α 0.33 capital share; convention;
δ 0.006 capital depreciation rate; fixes capital-output ratio;
Correlation of Shocks and Size of Innovations
ρ 0.95
1
3 autocorr. of TFP shock;
σz 0.0019 std. dev. of innovation to TFP shock; match 1.57% std. dev. of output;
Table 1: Parameters and their calibrated values. The Table reports calibrated parameter




u 0.070 unemployment rate
κν/y 0.004 hiring costs to output ratio
c/y 0.782 consumption to output ratio
wn/y 0.663 labor share
k/y 3.000 annual capital to output ratio
a/s 0.074 annual net worth to assets ratio
ς 0.020 external premium to funding
µ(θ) 0.835 job filling rate
γcp/ϕ 0.900 MRS to MRPL ratio
Table 2: Steady state for some variables in the ’output’ economy implied by the calibration
in Table 1.
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vacancy/unemployment ratio, θ = 0.539, reported in Hall (2005). This allows me to fix
the efficiency of the matching function, l̄, to 0.613. The bargaining power of the worker
is set to a conventional value of η = 0.5, to impose symmetry in the bargaining problem.
I set the elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment to ψ = 0.5, which is in the
range of reasonable values discussed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). This choice also
guarantees that the Hosios (1990) condition for efficiency is satisfied. I fix α = 0.33 to match
the capital share of income in the National Income and Product Accounts. I set the monthly
depreciation rate δ = 0.006, which pins down the annual capital-output ratio, k/y, in the
stochastic steady state to 3.
Finally, I turn to choosing ε = γcp/ϕ, perhaps the most controversial choice (see, e.g.,
Monacelli et al., 2010). I set ε = 0.9 in the high side of the range of sensible values. Notice
that the calibration strategy implies that larger values for ε, other things equal, correspond
to smaller search frictions. With the above choice, I can fix the hiring cost parameter, κ, to
0.626 and the parameter governing the taste for leisure, γ to 0.824.
I set the autocorrelation of the shock to productivity ρ = 0.95
1
3 . I choose a deviations of
technology innovations of size σz = 0.0019 in order to match the standard deviation of U.S.
GDP standard deviation of 1.57%.
3.2 The long-run equilibrium
Figure (1) shows the steps of determining the long-run equilibrium for a set of monitoring cost
values (χ ∈ (0.001, 0.3)) in a set of graphs in the ’output’ model. The steps in pinning down
analytically the long-run equilibrium are described also in Appendix A.2. The parameters
correspond to those used in the calibration of the dynamic model. The upper-left graph
translates the difference in the agency costs distortions into the increase in the output-capital
ratio. The upper right, the middle-left and the middle-right graphs show the determination
of the labor-capital and consumption-capital ratios, and of the wage respectively. Finally,
the bottom-right graph calculates the increase in the net worth-assets ratio from the increase
in the external finance premium.
How to interpret the graphs? For a given risk-free interest rate, increases in mark-up,
p, imply larger agency costs (since the economy suffers a deadweight loss associated to the
monitoring activity of the lender) and hence smaller acquired debt s−a, and in turn output
project s. Larger agency costs values also imply higher consumption to output ratio, higher


















































































Figure 1: Long-run equilibrium as per-unit monitoring cost, χ, varies from 0.001 to 0.3.
All other parameters held fixed at their benchmark values from Table 1. External finance
premium reported in annual basis points; equity-assets ratio is in annual terms. The direction
of arrows corresponds to direction of increase in χ.
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4 Inspecting the mechanism
Financing constraints affect hiring through three distinct channels: (a) a total wage bill
channel, (b) a hiring cost channel, and (c) a capital rental channel. This section builds
intuition for how these channels operate.
The Nash bargaining solution, Eq. (26), can be inserted into the job creation condition,































































(1− η) (Et {p̂t+1} − p̂t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
hiring costs channel
, (32)
where ε = γp/λϕ, π1 = 1 − x − ηl (θ) and π2 = (1− x)ψ − ηl (θ). A hat denotes the
percentage deviation of a variable from its long-run equilibrium value. Long-run equilibrium
values are given without subscript. In the equation above, R̂t = −EtΛ̂t,t+1 is the percentage
deviation of the real interest rate.
Eq. (32) reveals how a persistent increase in the TFP above trend affects the joint surplus
from the marginal match and, in turn, the hiring rate. But before describing how TFP shocks
affect hiring consider first how the shocks affect the external finance premium. Since net
worth in the agency cost model consists of previously accumulated capital, it is essentially
fixed in the period of the shock, so that the project size rises by more than does net worth.
Hence, the external finance premium, and in turn the mark-up pt, must rise on impact.
On the other hand, a positive feedback from aggregate TFP shock to the idiosyncratic firm
productivity should cause a rise in the mean of the distribution of firm-level productivity,
without changing its variance. Thus, the distribution of the idiosyncratic firm shock moves
to the right. Holding constant the contractually-specified bankruptcy threshold ω̄t, when
the distribution F (ωit, τt) shifts to the right, increases the possibility for any firm of drawing
idiosyncratic productivity ω̄it > ω̄t, i.e., the equilibrium probability of the average firm going
bankrupt decreases. This must translate into a fall of the external finance premium, and in
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turn a fall of pt. The two effects counteract each other with the latter prevailing, i.e., p̂t fall
below trend under TFP shocks (under a wide range of calibration values for υ).
The increase in the TFP shocks is captured by the increase in the marginal product of
labor, ϕ̂t, the decrease of the average cost of capital and in turn the mark-up pt, and the
difference (π2Et {τ̂t+1} − τ̂t) that accounts for the intertemporal change in the efficiency of
hiring. The increase in the marginal product of labor raises current production and in turn
consumption, ĉt. Since households desire a smooth consumption, they start to save. This
pushes down the interest rate below trend (raises EtΛ̂t,t+1), which encourages firms to invest
both in capital and in hiring workers. This leads to increased employment and respectively
higher market tightness, Etθ̂t+1, in the following period. The increase in employment raises
the marginal product of capital, which encourages more investment, and in turn, also enables
firms to spend more on hiring. Workers experience a rise in wages on account of higher
productivity, labor market tightness and disutility of work (MRS). This puts downward
pressure on hiring. In the long-run, employment returns to its steady state.
The importance of the financing constraints on hiring stands out immediately upon in-
specting Eq. (32). Relaxing of the financing constraints during a boom frees up resources
that are channeled proportionally to any of the input production costs. Respectively, looser
constraints reduce the opportunity cost of resources allocated to job creation, raising the
elasticity of market tightness through (a) a wage bill channel, whereby the incentives to
hire rise for a given wage bill; (b) a hiring cost channel, descreasing current to future hiring
costs; and (c) a capital rental channel, whereby a higher expected future capital stock (due
to the increase in current investment) implies a higher marginal product of labor. Notice
also that the hiring cost channel is less important for the amplification since current and
future mark-ups in general cancel each other: The difference between the current and future
hiring costs is not big.




















(Et {p̂t+1} − p̂t) . (33)
Although this is a general equilibrium environment, it is helpful to think of the equation as
the partial equilibrium determinant of the wage in the ’output’ model. The effect of a positive
TFP shock on wage is amplified by the fall of the current mark-up, i.e., wage in the ’output’
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model increases by more than the wages in the ’RBCM’ model, a model absent financing
constraints (pt = 1 for all t). The wage rise in the output model is slightly moderated by
the fall of the future mark-up. Essentially, given the way wages are determined in the model
and the way Nash bargaining is calibrated, wages in the ’output’ model respond strongly to
changes in TFP shocks so that the incentives for firms to hire do not change substantially
over the business cycle compared to the ’RBCM’ economy. Despite the fact that financing
constraints affect hiring directly, the Nash bargaining wage overshadows the model’s ability
to reproduce key labor market variables.
5 Results
In this section I study the dynamic behavior of the two models, ’output’ and ’RBCM’
economies. I solve the models by log-linearizing the equations characterizing equilibrium
around the deterministic steady state. All equilibrium equations in the ’output’ economy
are collected in the Appendix, subsection A.1. The resulting systems of linear rational
expectations difference equations are solved using DYNARE.15 The goal is to analyze how
loosening of financing constraints impacts the observed business-cycle fluctuations in real
activity in general and employment in particular in response to TFP shocks of a plausible
magnitude. Analysis is carried out as follows: I first compare dynamic adjustment paths
towards the steady state after a TFP disturbance. Secondly, I contrast their predictions for
business cycle statistics based on simulated data.
5.1 Simulation and main findings: benchmark
In this section, I analyze the dynamics of the simulated benchmark models.
The impulse response function for the two model specifications are depicted in Figure 2.
Three observations stand out immediately. First, the agency cost model is able to generate
simultaneously both an effect of persistence and an effect of amplification. The fall in the
finance premium in two periods after impact induces output, capital and employment to rise
more in the model with agency costs than in the credit frictionless economy, ’RBCM’ model.
Moreover the sluggish response of net worth produces an effect of persistence in the same
three variables. Employment reaches its peak respectively after 6 months upon impact in
the ’output’ model, while in the ’RBCM’ model it reaches its peak only after three periods.
15Dynare is a pre-processor and a collection of MATLAB® and GNU Octave routines which solve models
with forward looking variables. See http://www.dynare.org.
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Figure 2: Response to a shock in TFP. The Figure displays percentage responses (1 in the
plots corresponds to a 1% increase over the respective steady state value) of endogenous
variables to a one percent shock in TFP. The time unit of the model is a month.
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Second, and more importantly for my discussion, the responses of the labor share in
the two specifications are remarkably different in terms of shape, size, and direction. To
understand why first observe the behaviour of consumption. Consumption jumps up upon
the impact of the shock in the two specifications. The direction of responses of consumption
in the the ’output’ and ’RBCM’ are alike, besides the fact that in the ’output’ model it jumps
up more. On the other hand, the fall in the mark-up in the ’output’ model is channelled
into an increase of the wage, i.e., reduction of financing costs in boom are translated at large
into wage increases. Together with the increase of consumption, wages in the ’output’ model
become highly procyclical and more volatile than wages in the ’RBCM’ model.
Third, neither of the two models is able to replicate the volatility of employment and
labor market tightness. This result is manifestation of the findings in Shimer (2005): The
Nash wage absorbs most of the increases in productivity. On top of that, in the ’output’
model, it absorbs the resources that are related to decreased monitoring costs (loosening of
the financing constraints), thus eliminating the incentive for hiring. As a result, fluctuations
in TFP shocks have little impact on the employment.
I also compare business cycles statistics computed from simulations of the two model
specifications. I compare them to the business cycles statistics of their counterparts from the
U.S. data. The results are reported in Table 3. The first two columns for model economies
show statistics which are the theoretical, infinite sample moments of monthly variables.
The last two columns for model economies show a measure more comparable to empirical
estimates of these objects. They show statistics which are computed by simulating the
models 1000 times for 697 monthly periods. The statistics are averages over the HP-filtered
simulations. The statistics are conformation of the analysis above. To the extent that one
hoped financing constraints would amplify TFP shocks on labor market variables, the results
are disappointing.
5.2 Simulation and main findings: rigid wage
A lot of the new research has focused on wage determination. In a sense, the wage is
indeterminant within a specified range in the models with Nash wage, i.e., there is a range
of wages at which an employer and worker prefer to match rather than breakup. Loosely
speaking, each will agree to any wage larger than the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure but smaller than the marginal product of labor, if the alternative
is breaking up. This insight has motivated many researchers, starting with Hall (2005) and
Shimer (2005), to investigate the role of rigid wages in search models.
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U.S. Theoretical Finite Sample
economy RBCM Output RBCM Output
Relative s.d. y 1.570 1.410 1.570 1.482 1.660
θ 16.613 3.211 3.852 3.206 3.886
k 0.214 1.183 1.194 1.018 1.178
n 0.707 0.126 0.133 0.110 0.134
wn/y 0.493 0.035 0.172 0.023 0.172
w 0.634 0.913 1.064 0.902 1.063
c 0.581 0.747 0.881 0.749 0.873
ς 29.995  4.832  4.838
Correlations y,n 0.792 0.765 0.727 0.762 0.737
y,wn/y -0.200 -0.521 0.922 -0.765 0.926
y,ς -0.582  -0.856  -0.863
u,v -0.905 -0.879 -0.905 -0.873 -0.908
Autocorrelations y 0.839 0.990 0.992 0.990 0.992
n 0.877 0.991 0.993 0.991 0.993
ς 0.706  0.819  0.828
Table 3: Business cycle properties of the U.S. economy and model economies. Statistics for
the U.S. economy are computed using quarterly HP-filtered data from 1951:q1 to 2010:q1.
The first two columns for model economies show statistics which are the theoretical, infinite
sample moments of monthly variables. The last two columns for model economies show
statistics which are computed by simulating the models 1000 times for 697 monthly periods
under the baseline calibrated parameter values. The statistics are averages over the HP-
filtered simulations. The standard deviations of all variables (except of output) are relative
to output.
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More formally, the Nash bargaining solution, Eq. (26), can be rewritten as a weighted
average of the bargaining set limits, defined by the range of wage levels consistent with a
non-negative surplus for both the worker and the firm respectively, [wt, wt]:





























Wage rigidity does not effect the efficient formation or retention of a match. But, it
influences the firms’ intensity of posting vacancies since it impacts on the firms’ expected
benefit from a worker. This arguement can be represented graphically with Figure 3.16 A
positive TFP shock generally affects the bargaining set in two ways: it tends to shift it
toward higher wages (as both reservation wages, wt and wt, generally increase) and it tends
to increase its size (as the firms’ reservation wage is more sensitive to the shock than the
workers’). Wage rigid of any type, then, acts as a drag on the wage and generally limits
its adjustment proportional to the change of the size of the bargaining set. Wage rigidity
(illustrated by the vertical dashed line, in case the wage is perfectly rigid) amplifies the
employment response to TFP shocks by allowing the firm to hold to a bigger portion of the
match surplus.
The effect of the TFP shock on the bargaining set is amplified in the presence of financing
constraints: the bargaining set moves to even higher wages and its size increases more
compared to its response in the ’RBCM’ economy. Thus, financing constraints and wage
rigidity reinforce each other amplifying firms’ hiring intensity by making the firm share of
the surplus even more procyclical and volatile.
I extend the model to incorporate real wage rigidity. I do this through a simple wage
adjustment rule. I distinguish between a target wage, wTt , which is determined by the Nash
bargaining solution, and the actual wage, wt, which is a weighted average of the target wage
16I borrow the the reasoning and the graph from Monacelli et al. (2010), extending analysis to a model
economy with financing constraints.
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Figure 3: Response of the bargaining sets to a shock in TFP. The Figure displays responses
of the wage bargaining set in a economy with financing constraints (green horizontal line)
and in a economy without financing constraints (green horizontal line) to a shock in TFP.
and last period actual wage. The rule is given by
wt = (1− σ)wTt + σwt−1, (34)
where σ is a partial adjustment parameter that reflects the degree of wage rigidity. When
σ = 0, the actual wage corresponds to the Nash bargained wage and I recover the baseline
case.
The effects of real wage rigidity on economic activity and labor market variables can
be demonstrated by shutting down the wage adjustment almost entirely, i.e. by setting
σ = 0.95. The impulse response functions to the TFP shocks for the two model specifications
are depicted in Figure 4. The qualitative responses of the endogenous variables are very close
to the baseline specification. The only big difference is the response of the labor share in
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the ’output’ model. Logically, the labor share becomes less procyclical. This result can also
be observed by comparing the business cycles statistics computed from simulations of the
two model specifications to their counterparts from the U.S. data. The results are reported
in Table 4. The rigid wage ’RBCM’ model cannot replicate the observed patterns of the
labor share and enough volatility of labor market tightness, jointly. The correlation between
labor share and output and the relative standard deviation of the labor market tightness in
the data are -0.200 and 16.613, respectively. By varying σ I find that a fairly high degree
of rigidity is needed, σ = 0.99, to replicate volatility of labor market tightness in the data,
whereas the model requires a high degree of flexibility, σ = 0.2, to explain the correlation
between labor share and output. On the contrary, high levels of rigidity in the ’output’
model, σ = 0.99, are consistent with both the labor market tightness (even overshooting
it) and the negative comovement of labor share and output. The joint presence of wage
rigidity and financing constraints is important for the dynamics of the labor market, as they
reinforce each other to amplify the effect of TFP shocks on labor market quantities, while
aligning the simulated comovement of labor share and output with its counterpart in the
data.
6 Conclusion
I have studied a model in which shocks to aggregate TFP lead to large fluctuations in labor
markets, and the amplification is mediated through financial conditions under some degree
of wage rigidity. Financial constraints per se can not help to generate the empirical labor
market statistics due to the Nash bargaining wage. I conclude that the main substantive
contribution of search models with financing constraints relies on the presence of match-
specific rents and the opportunity for a richer set of wage setting processes. This is where the
contribution of the financing constraints in the current framework lies: financial conditions
lead to a much larger set of match-specific rents. Allegedly, the joint presence of the two
frictions can be helpful in explaining even complicated phenomenon as the Great Depression.
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Figure 4: Response to a shock in TFP with rigid wages, σ = 0.95. The Figure displays
percentage responses (1 in the plots corresponds to a 1% increase over the respective steady
state value) of endogenous variables to a one percent shock in TFP. The time unit of the
model is a month.
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U.S. Theoretical Finite Sample
economy RBCM Output RBCM Output
Relative s.d. y 1.570 1.628 1.806 1.644 1.849
θ 16.613 10.119 12.691 10.014 12.625
k 0.214 0.962 1.125 0.979 1.118
n 0.707 0.332 0.398 0.328 0.397
wn/y 0.493 0.144 0.148 0.142 0.147
w 0.634 0.793 0.928 0.798 0.929
c 0.581 0.695 0.816 0.706 0.812
ς 29.995  4.558  4.550
Correlations y,n 0.792 0.611 0.603 0.602 0.604
y,wn/y -0.200 -0.635 0.418 -0.631 0.434
y,ς -0.582  -0.807  -0.817
u,v -0.905 -0.660 -0.708 -0.657 -0.717
Autocorrelations y 0.839 0.985 0.987 0.986 0.988
n 0.877 0.966 0.973 0.966 0.973
ς 0.706  0.718  0.733
Table 4: Business cycle properties of the U.S. economy and model economies with rigid wage
(σ = 0.95). Statistics for the U.S. economy are computed using quarterly HP-filtered data
from 1951:q1 to 2010:q1. The first two columns for model economies show statistics which
are the theoretical, infinite sample moments of monthly variables. The last two columns for
model economies show statistics which are computed by simulating the models 1000 times
for 697 monthly periods under the baseline calibrated parameter values. The statistics are
averages over the HP-filtered simulations. The standard deviations of all variables (except
of output) are relative to output.
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A.1 Collecting equations: ’output’ model
In equilibrium the household chooses plans to maximize its utility, the firm and the financial
intermediary solve their maximization problems. The equations characterizing the equilib-
rium for the ’output’ model are ("H": the first-order condition for the household; "F": the
first-order conditions for the firm, the conditions for the debt contract, production function,
evolution of net worth, evolution of entrepreneur’s capital stock, respectively; "K": evolution
of aggregate capital stock; "M": market clearing condition; "W": the wage bargaining rule;
"L": evolution of aggregate employment, market tightness, job-filling rate, respectively; and
"A": an auxiliary variable)
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F: ptf (ω̄t, τt) =
f ′ (ω̄t, τt)
g′ (ω̄t, τt)
[ptg (ω̄t, τt)− 1] ,
F: yt = ptat [1/ (1− ptf (ω̄t, τt))] ,
F: yt = ωmtτtkαt n
1−α
t ,
F: at = zt [(1− δ) + rt] ,
F: zt+1 = ytf (ω̄t, τt)− ζt,
K: kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it,
M: yt(1− χF (ω̄t, τt)) = ct + it + ωmtτtκvt,



























The above equations determine the evolution of quantities (c, y, θ, v, n, k, z, a, ζ), prices
(p, r, w), the job-filling rate (µ (θ)), the default threshold (ω̄), and an auxiliary variable (ℵ).
Note that there are 15 equations for 15 variables, plus the equation for the exogenous TFP
process







Some of the results in this subsection are generally useful for examining the impact of agency
costs on the long-run equilibrium allocations. Below I shortly list derivation of some main
long-run ratios for the ’output’ model. The analysis of the ’investment’ model is symmetric.
Given the household’s preferences in Eq. (19), the risk-free return on capital is
R = 1/β,
thereby relating β to observations on R.
The log-normal pdf has two parameters, the variance of logω and the mean of ω. I
fix the long-run mean to unity, Eω = 1, and then calibrate the steady state value of the
variance so that, in the long-run equilibrium, F (ω̄, 1) is equal to a specified calibrated











ω̄ (1− F (ω̄, 1)). The financial intermediary’s share of output is g (ω̄, 1) ≡
∫ ω̄
0
ωdF (ω, 1) −
χF (ω̄, 1) + ω̄ (1− F (ω̄, 1)). Then, the derivatives of the shares with respect to ω̄ are:
f ω̄ (ω̄, 1) = − (1− F (ω̄, 1)) ,
gω̄ (ω̄, 1) = −f ω̄ (ω̄, 1)− χφ (ω̄, 1) ,
where the density function is φ (ω̄, 1) = F ω̄ (ω̄, 1). After imposing Eω = 1, I substitute the
mark-up p, from Eq. (7),
pf (ω̄, 1) =
f ′ (ω̄, 1)
g′ (ω̄, 1)








1− pg (ω̄, 1)
}}
,
and targeting a given long-run equilibrium annual external finance premium ς, I solve nu-
merically for the variance of logω.
The long-run value of the output-capital ratio, y/k, from combining Eq. (11) and Eq.
(23), is given by
y/k = p (R− 1 + δ) /α,




From Eq. (20), the long-run employment rate satisfies
n = l (θ) / (x+ l (θ)) ,
which in turn allows to pin down the long-run values of capital and output.




(1− η) (1− α) (1− ε)x
1− βπ1
,
which, in turn from Eq. (30), pins down the consumption-output ratio
c
y





Finally, I can find the net worth and the wage from Eq. (8) and Eq. (26), respectively.
B Data
I discuss how I obtain the macroeconomic time series for the real economy, from 1951:q1 up
to 2010:q1, each of which has a theoretical counterpart in the present paper. The data is
identical to one used by Shimer (2010).
• Output y: I use a quantity-weighted measure of real Gross Domestic Product, National
Income and Product Accounts Table 1.1.3, line 1. I express this in per capita terms,
dividing by the population series from Prescott et al. (2009).
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• Vacancy-unemployment ratio θ: I proxy the number of open vacancies v with the
Conference Board help-wanted advertising index, available from the Conference Board.
I divide this by the number of unemployed workers u, series LNS13000000 drawn from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
• Consumption c: I use a quantity-weighted measure of real consumption of nondurables
and services, National Income and Product Accounts Table 1.1.3, Rows 5 and 6. I
express this in per capita terms, dividing by the population series from Prescott et al.
(2009).
• Capital stock k: I measure the capital stock using the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s
Fixed Asset Table 1.1, line 1. This is an annual series, which I interpolate. I divide by
the population series from Prescott et al. (2009).
• Labor share wn/y: I measure the labor share using National Income and Product
Accounts Table 1.10. Labor income is taken from line 2. Capital income is consumption
of fixed capital (line 23) plus net operating surplus of private enterprises (line 11) minus
proprietors’ income (line 15). Labor share is labor income divided by the sum of labor
and capital income.
• Employment n: I use the measure of employment from Prescott et al. (2009), divided
by population from the same paper.
• Labor compensation w: Real wages are measured by the labor share wn/y divided by
employment n and multiplied by output y.
• The external finance premium ς: The premium is measured by the difference between
Moody’s BAA corporate bond yields and 3-Month Treasury Bill (TB3MS), available
from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ database FRED®II.
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